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SN a case recently presented to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, it
was held that a child adopted under the statutes of Wisconsin would
not take by descent from a brother of the adoptive parent.' An argu-
ment was made to the effect that adoption, being unknown to the com-
mon law, must be presumed to have been taken from the Roman Law,
that under the Roman Law, adoption carried with it the right of col-
lateral inheritance and that the same result should follow when we pro-
vide for adoption. The court, in its opinion, very properly, it is thought,
did not discuss this argument, treating the case as turning upon a
correct interpretation of the statute involved. However. as the argu-
ment is frequently met with and sometimes followed after what seems
very superficial study, the writer believes that a discussion of the sub-
ject will be found of more than passing interest. In this article the
writer simply restates from the brief filed by his firm the results of the
study given to the subject, largely by his associates, in the case above
referred to.
No common law state which enacts a statute providing for adoption
stands in such relation to the Roman law that the statute can be said
to have been adopted from that law, and least of all from the ancient
Roman law. Modern statutes dealing with adoption are framed to take
care of a social practice, the origin of which in this country was wholly
independent of the practice known to the Roman state. There is no
historical relation either in the laws or in the practice itself. To an
understanding of this question an examination of the history of the
Roman law and of Roman society becomes iecessary. If there be
eliminated in any given case under, the ancient Roman law, those ele-
ments which are peculiar to the ancient Roman social structure, and
for which no analogy can be found in modem society, there remains
no right of inheritance from or succession to collateral kindred of the
adoptive parent. Under the law as settled by Justinian, the same thing
* Member of the Milwaukee Bar.
The references to and translations from Latin, French and German material
are largely the work of Mr. Elwyn Evans, also of the Milwaukee Bar.
'I re Bradley's Estate, 2oi N.W. 973 (Wis.).
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was true with an exception which when analyzed is found to rest on
blood relationship.
The historical development of the Roman law covers a period of ap-
proximately one thousand years, from the Twelve Tables (about 450
B.C.) to the Justinian Code (529 to 534 A.D.). Roman law during
this period went through a course of gradual development not greatly
unlike that of the common law of England.
Roman society during the same period went through a slow but very
important process of change. Beginning in the patriarchial stage, it
was gradually transformed until, by the time of Justinian, it had reached
a stage not unlike that of modern western societies. Adoption was
known to both stages of the law and to both stages of social develop-
ment and the law of adoption changed with the changes in the social and
governmental fabric.
To understand the institution of adoption in the ancient Roman state
and to understand succession under the Roman law, it is necessary to
understand the institution of the family, the position of the father of
the family (pater familias), his extraordinary power over his family
(patria potestas) and what is known as agnatic relationship.
The family, in early Roman history, was a little kingdom of which
the eldest male ascendant (pater familias) was the king. His power
extended to life and death and was as unqualified over his children and
their households as over his slaves. From the standpoint of property
rights, the family might be compared to a modern corporation of which
the pater familias was the public officer; he was vested with all of the
property of the family and subject to all of its obligations. The physical
death of the pater familias made little difference to the aggregate of the
family property; it passed on as a unit, rights and obligations alike,
to his heir or group of heirs, who were deemed, for the purposes of law
and religion, as carrying on the existence of the family.
Among the members of the family were to be found, quite naturally,
the descendants of the pater familias. These were related to him by
ties of blood, or what the Romans called cognation. To be contrasted
with this, is the artificial legal relationship existing by virtue of the
family tie which the Romans called agnation. Not all of the cognatic
or blood descendants, however, were members of the family. Sons or
other male descendants who had been emancipated and daughters or
other female descendants who had been given in marriage were com-
pletely cut off from the agiwtic family. On the other hand, there could
be many persons who were not blood relatives of the pater familias
who were, nevertheless, members of his family and, consequently,
bound together by the ties of agnation. Thus the wife of the pater
familias and the wives of all of his male descendants who were still
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under his power were within the agnatic group. A stranger, not sub-
ject to any other paternal power (sni juris), might join the family and
fall under the power of the pater familias. This was known as adroga-
tion. Or, again, one who was under another patria potestas could be
brought into the family by adoption. The family, in short, was com-
posed of all those who were subject to the absolute power of the pater
familias, quite irrespective of blood relationship. It was at once some-
thing greater than and something less than the modem family. Ag-
nation was the artificial legal relationship which existed between the
members of the same family or between all of those who would have
been members of the same family were the common pater familias
still living.
Before the time of Justinian, adoption created an agnatic but did not
create a cognatic relationship.
Justinian's Digest 1, 7, 23:
.... adoptio enim non ius sanguinis, sed ins adguationis adfcrt .. 
(Translation) "...;. adoption does not create a tie of blood, but the
tie of agnation .....
It is important to appreciate the full force of this distinction, for
without doing so it is impossible to get a correct understanding of
adoption under the Roman law. Agnation, as we have seen, was a
highly artificial and purely legal relationship. It was an institution of
the earliest statute law, or what the Romans called the civil law (jus
civile). By the term civil law, the Romans meant something quite dif-
ferent from what we mean today. It was the law of the city of Rome
(literally, citizen's or civis' law) before that city had expanded into a
world empire. It was a purely local law which reflected the institutions
peculiar to the Roman people as contrasted with the jus gentium or the
law of peoples, which reflected the institutions common to all man-
kind (see Justinian's Institutes 1, 2). It rested upon the XII Tables
and the earliest statutes, while the law of peoples, or jus gentium,
was introduced into the body of Roman jurisprudence by the prmtor's
equitable reforms and to a certain extent, also, by the decrees of the
emperors.
It was this civil law relationship which was established by adoption
and not blood relationship. Blood relationship was recognized only by
the law of nature (jus naturale) and the law of peoples (jus gentium).
Girard, an eminent authority on Roman law, in his Manuel Elemen-
taire de Droit Roinain, 6th Ed. Paris 1918, at page 128, says:
"With regard to the family of the adopter, he (the adopted person)
becomes the gentile of all the gentiles of the adopter, the agnate of all
his agnates and, since agnation implies cognation, in becoming their
agnate, he becomes their cognate. However, this point, whether with
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regard to the adopter or with regard to his relatives, only exists from
the point of view of the civil law (jus civile) ; consequently, the adopted
person, who becomes the agnate and the cognate of all the agnates of
the adopter, does not become the cognate of his cognates and if the civil
bond is broken by an emancipation, for example, he ceases at the same
time to be the agnate and the cognate of the relatives of the adopter
and of the adopter himself."
Inasmuch as adoption created the tie of agnation, the adopted child
became an agnate to all of the adopting parent's agnates. This is no
more than we should expect from the civil law character of the institu-
tion of adoption.
Girard says: ". ... as agnation implies cognation, in becoming their
agnate, he becomes their cognate."
But this was a mere legal fiction to enable the adopted child, in case
of an intestacy, to take in the same class as the cognates in case he
should for any reason fail to come in with the preferred class of
agnates.
This will be apparent when we consider the rules of intestate suc-
cession under the Roman law. Under the law of the XII Tables,
the sui heredes, or those liberated fronthe paternal power by the death
of the pater familias, were given the estate. If none of these took the
estate, it was given to the nearest agnate. If he did not take, then it
went to the gentiles. The gentiles must not be confused with blood
relatives. They were merely members of the same gens, or clan.
The provisions of the XII Tables here referred to read as follows:
XII tab. V. 4, 5: Si intestato naritur, cui suus heres nec escit. adgna-
tis proximus familiarn habeto. Si adgnatus nec escit, gentiles fainiliam
habento."
(Translation) "If a man dies intestate, without a suis heres, the
nearest agnate shall have his estate. If he has no agnate, the gentiles
shall have his estate."
Buckland says:
"No text survives, and probably none existed, laying down in express
terms the right of succession of the suis heres. It is taken for granted
in the first of these texts. The word heres indeed means, as it seems,
owner: the suus heres is not exactly inheriting, but assuming control of
what was in a sense his already. More significant is the fact that the
agnates and the gentiles are not said to become heredes. The words are
not heredes sunto, but familian habento."
(Literal translation of heredes sunto, is let them be heirs; of familiam
habento, let them have the family.) 2
"Elementary Principles of Roman Private Laz--Buckland, p. 185.
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The old law of the XII Tables was modified by the praetor's equitable
reforms so that all children, whether under patria potestas or emanci-
pated therefrom, were called in the first class (unde libri). In the
second class (unde legitirn) were all those who had a civil law claim
(sui heredes, nearest agnate, gentiles). In the third class came the cog-
nates (unde cognati). It will readily be seen that one person might be
in all three of these classes. If, for any reason, he was unable to avail
himself of his prior classification, he could come in under a later one.
To enable an adopted child to do this was the purpose and the only
purpose of this fictitious cognation.3
In any case, as Girard says, it was dependent upon the existence of
the agnatic relationship and did not extend to the cognates of the
adopter.
If a son, whether natural or adopted, was kept in a family until the
death of the pater familias, all his earnings (with certain minor excep-
tions which need not be considered) had, of course, gone to augment
the property of the family, the title to which was vested in the pater
familias. Justice required that such a son, whether natural or adopted,
succeed thereto with the other members of the family. Thus we see
that neither succession nor adoption could proceed on the same theory
under the ancient Roman law as under our law. If an adopted son
remained in potestas (that is, remained unemancipated) until, let us
say, sixty years of age, all his earnings (with exceptions not of con-
trolling importance) would have gone to augment the common fund,
with the title vested in the pater familias until the latter's death at, let us
say, eighty-five, when he simply succeeded to what as a member of the
legal family was his own.
We can find no analogy under our law because we have in our law
neither the patria potestas, nor agnatic relationship, which is perfectly
clear were the controlling features in the Roman law on this subject.4
Before any comparison can be made between an adoption under mod-
ern law and adoption under the ancient Roman law, we must find a situa-
*Buckland's A Textbook of Roman Law, pp. 366, 367.
'A fuller discussion of the general principles above explained may be found
in the following works:
Roman Private La--R. W. Leage, 19oo, Macmillan and Co., pp. 66-97.
(A good explanation of the Sources of Roman Law is to be found on pp. 2-,40.
Leage's discussion, though elementary, is clear and easily understood.)
Maines' Andent Law, ch. V, especially pp. 140-157, ch. VI, especially pp. 192-2o2.
Sohm's Institutes of Roman Law, translated from the German by Ledlie,
19o7, Claredon Press, Oxford, pp. 16-ig (Sources of Roman Law); 177-178;
449-452; 479-488; 530-540. II Corpus Juris, 941-943 (for discussion of the legal
sources of Roman law.)
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tion in the latter from which both agnation and patria potestas have been
eliminated and in such a situation one who had been adopted lost all
right of succession in the adoptive family. If the pater familias had
adopted a son and that son was still subject to his power at his death,
in other words, was still under his patria potestas, that adopted son, be-
cause of the agnatic relation, succeeded with the other sons who were
both agnatically and cognatically related to him. If, however, a son,
natural or adopted, had been emancipated before the death of the
pater familias, he did not, under the old civil law, share in the succes-
sion. He was no longer a member of what we might term the family
corporation. With respect to a natural son who had been emancipated,
the prwtor, under his equitable jurisdiction, permitted him to take along
with the sons who remained under patria potestas. The prctor's re-
forms, however, did not extend to an adopted son who had been emanci-
pated. To illustrate, let us assume that A had three sons, B and C, being
natural sons, and D, an adopted son. Assume that B and D are emanci-
pated but that C continues under patria potestas. If A dies, all three
surviving him, C takes because he has remained in the agnatic relation-
ship. B also takes because, by the equitable reforms of the prator,
emancipated natural sons were placed on the same footing as natural
sons in power. D, however, does not take because by the emancipation
the only tie which bound him to his adoptive father, that of agnation,
was severed. This is supported by the following quotation from The
Institutes of Justinian, translated by J. B. Moyle, 5th ed., Book III,
Title i, p. 1O4:
"As to emancipated children, they have, by the civil law, no right to
succeed to an intestate; for, having ceased to be in the power of their
parent, they are not family heirs, nor are they called by any other title
in the statute of the Twelve Tables. The praetor, however, following
natural equity, gives them possession of the goods of the deceased
merely as children, exactly as if they had been in his power at the time
of his death, and this whether they stand alone or whether there are f am-
ily heirs as well. Consequently, if a man die leaving two children, one
emancipated, and the other in his power at the time of his decease, the
latter is sole heir by the civil law, as being the only family heir; but
through the former's being admitted to part of the inheritance by the
indulgence of the prxtor, the family heir becomes heir to part of the
inheritance only. Emancipated children, however, who have given
themselves in adoption are not thus admitted, under the title of children,
to share the property of their natural father, if at the time of his de-
cease they are in their adoptive family; though it is otherwise if they
are emancipated during his lifetime by their adoptive father, for then
they are admitted as if they had been emancipated by him and had never
been in an adoptive family, while, conversely, as regards their adoptive
father, they are henceforth regarded as strangers. If, however, they
are emancipated by the adoptive after the death of the natural father, as
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regards the former they are strangers all the same, and yet do not
acquire the rank of children as regards succession to the property of
the latter; the reason of this rule being the injustice of putting it
within the power of an adoptive father to determine to whom the
property of the natural father shall belong, whether to his children or
to his agnates. Adoptive are thus not so well off as natural children in
respect of rights of succession: for by the indulgence of the prator the
latter retain their rank as children even after emancipation, although
they lose it by the civil law; while the former, if emancipated, are not as-
sisted even by the pretor. And there is nothing wrong in their being
thus differently treated, because civil changes can affect rights annexed
to a civil title, but not rights annexed to a natural title and natural de-
scendants, though on emancipation they cease to be family heirs, cannot
cease to be children or grandchildren; whereas on the other hand
adoptive children are regarded as strangers after emancipation, because
they lose the title and name of son or daughter, which they have acquired
by a civil change, namely adoption, by another civil change, namel.
emancipation." 5
When we carefully examine the essential elements of relationship
and succession under the ancient Roman law, we realize that wherever
patria potestas and agnatic relationship were eliminated, the adopted
child lost the right of succession. Neither patria potestas nor agnatic
relationship are known to our modem social structure or to our modern
law and no analogies can be drawn except where both are eliminated.
When both are eliminated we find a situation in which under the ancient
Roman law the right of succession failed. We have seen that it failed
in the case of the emancipated adopted son under circumstances where
in the case of an emancipated 'natural son it would not have failed.
Justinian thoroughly overhauled the old law of intestate succession
based upon patria potestas and agnatic relationship. Certain modifica-
tions tending to weaken the force of paternal power and to substitute
the cognatic for the agnatic principle, had been brought about under the
influence of the praetors and by express imperial legislation. It was,
however, left for Justinian entirely to sweep away the old civil law
ideas. His final legislation, embodied in his ii8th and 127th Novels,
has no place for either patria potestas or agnation.
With respect to adopted children, Justinian worked out two rules of
succession, which commentators have treated as involving two forms
of adoption which they came to designate as adoptio plena and adoptio
minus plena. The adoptio was plena (complete) where the child was
adopted by a natural ascendant, generally a maternal grandfather or a
great grandfather. In this case, the principle of blood relationship is
not violated and Justinian left the old law as it was.
'Italics are writers.
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Where, however, the child was given in adoption to a stranger in
blood, the adoption was minus plena (less complete). The adopted child
remained under the potestas of his natural father. He did not enter
the adopting father's family nor fall under his potestas, nor did he
become related by the ties of agnation either to the adopting father or
to his agnates. Inasmuch as he did not become an agnate of the adopting
father's agnates, he could not become a cognate of theirs by virtue of
the old civil law fiction.6
Adoption minus plena did nothing more than confer upon the adopted
child the right to share in the adoptive father's estate in case of an
intestacy. He did not even acquire a child's right to upset his father's
will in case he was overlooked or in case he was not given a just portion
of the estate.
Justinian describes his reforms in his Institutes, Book III, Chapter I,
Section I4:
"... . We found cases in which sons by entering an adoptive
family forfeited their right of succeeding their natural parents, and
then, the tie of adoption being easily broken by emancipation, lost all
title to succeed their adoptive parents as well. We have corrected this,
in our usual manner, by a constitution which enacts that, when a
natural father gives his son in adoption to another person, the son's
rights shall remain the same in every particular as if he had continued
in the power of his natural father, and the adoption had never taken
place except only that he shall be able to succeed his adoptive father
should he die intestate. If, however, the latter makes a will, the son
cannot obtain any part of the inheritance either by the civil or by the
praetorian law, that is to say, either by impeaching the will as unduteous
or by applying for possession against the will; for, being related by no
tie of blood, the adoptive father is not bound either to institute him heir
or to disinherit him, even though he has been adopted, in accordance with
the SC. Afinianum, from among three brothers; for, even under these
circumstances, he is not entitled to a fourth of what he might have
taken on intestacy, nor has he any action for its recovery. We have,
however, by our constitution excepted persons adopted by natural
ascendants, for between them and their adopters there is the natural
tie of blood as well as the civil tie of adoption, and therefore in this case
we have preserved the older law, as also in that of an independent person
giving himself in adrogation; all of which enactment can be gathered
in its special details from the tenor of the aforesaid constitution. 17
Again in Book I, Chapter XI of the Institutes he says:
". ... But by the law, as now settled by our constitution, when a
'Justinian's Digest I, 7, 23; Buckland's A Textbook of Roman Law, pp.
366-367; Girard's Manuel Elementaire de Droit Roinain, 6th Ed., Paris, 1918,
182, 183.
'Italics are writers.
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child in power is given in adoption to a stranger by his natural father,
the power of the latter is not extinguished: no right passes to the
adoptive father, nor is the person adopted in his power, though we have
given a right of succession in case of the adoptive father dying intestate."
The original constitution to which Justinian refers in the former
quotation is found in the Codex 8, 48, IO, the material portions of which
are as follows:
.. . . Consequently, we, by way of correcting these uncertainties
and defects, have enacted that when a person has been given in adoption
to a stranger, the rights of the natural father shall be disturbed as little
as possible but he shall remain as though he had not been transferred
to another family..... .When, therefore, a son is transferred by
adoption to a stranger in blood, according to what we have now decreed,
he retains intact all of the rights to an action for an unjust testamentary
disposition (querella inofficiosi testamenti) or to all other kinds of suc-
cessions, whether testate or intestate, which are conferred upon the
children, so that he himself is able to profit from his natural father and
from him receive that which is due him by nature..... .We have
authorized such an adoptive parent, that is, a stranger, if he wishes, to
leave the adopted son nothing in his will, but whatever he does leave
him is purely of his own free will and not the result of a legal obliqation.
Since, in all respects, we have placed the son in the position which he
would naturally occupy, it is manifest that (the acquisition of) all
property which comes to a son in paternal power (ftlius familias),
according to our laws, goes, not to the adoptive father, a stranger in
blood, but to the natural father, and he holds a life interest in such
property. He remains in the religious affiliations (sacra), or his natural
father just as though, in spite of his new relationship, no modification
of his original blood relationship had taken place. But, if the child
remains in the status of adoption without ever having been emancipated,
we have decreed that, in such case, the adoption shall benefit him only
to this extent, that he should not be deprived of succession to his
adoptive father, who is a stranger in blood to him, upon his dying
intestate, but that he should also have the right to acquire property
bequeathed to him in his natural father's will. Even according to the
old law, the bond of cognation (blood relationship), with the natural
father was not dissolved by an adoption. The rights incident to the
adoption arise without disturbing certain other rights existing by virtue
of the natural law and, while the child was related to the adoptive
family by the bonds of civil law (i.e. lus Civile), he was related to his
natural family by ties of blood ..... .Consequently, we enact that,
although such a son (by adoption minus plena) enjoys all of his natural
rights, nevertheless, if the adopting father, being a stranger in blood,
dies intestate, he has the right of a family heir (suus heres) to his
estate and to his alone, so that he does not retain his former agnatic
rights with respect to the family of the adopting father, nor does this
family retain, with respect to him, any community of ownership in his
property, but he stands as a stranger to this family. But if, however,
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all of the rights acquired by adoption are dissolved by emancipation,
absolutely no vestige of his right to succeed the adopting stranger
remaifts even though the adopting stranger should die intestate, but he
continues to look to his natural father only, even as though he had
never been given in adoption..... ."s
Modern commentators, whenever they have discussed the point, have
uniformly stated that by adoption minus plena, the adopted child did
not become an agnate of the adopting parent's agnates, nor did he
acquire any rights of succeeding them on intestacy.
Dr. J. B. Moyle, one of the great English authorities on the Roman
law, says in his edition of Justinian's Institutes, pp. 356-357 foot note
to § 14 that:
c*.... For Justinian's changes in the law of adoption (Cod. 8,
48, 10) see on Bk. i. II. 2 supr. Their result, so far as relates to
intestate succession was as follows:
(i) If the adoptio was minus plena, the adoptatus retained all his
rights against the estate of his natural father, and acquired besides a
claim as snus to that of the adoptive father, if he died intestate, though
none to that of the latter's agnates .... "
Winscheid, one of the principal German authorities, in his book,
Lehrbuch des Pandercktenrechts, (translation, Textbook of the Law of
the Paudects), Vol. 4, P. 838 says:
"(C) Where adoption does not have the full effect, it does not pro-
duce the relationship of paternal power between the adoptive father and
the adopted son, but only a natural relationship which, however, does
not confer upon the adopted child any rights of necessary heirship with
respect to his adoptive father, and does not establish any relationship
for the purpose of inheritance between the adopted son and the relatives
of the adoptive father. (C. VIII 47, (48) io) ."9
R. W. Leage, in his Roman Private Law, says:
(p. 74) "In every other case (i.e., adoption by strangers or any
person but an ascendant) the adoption was minus plena; the child, as
a fact, passed into the physical control of the person adopting, but as a
' So far as could be learned no English translation of the Codex has even been
published. One of the writer's associates has in his library a German translation
prepared by certain professors of the University of Leipzig under the direction
of Carl F. F. Sintenis, published in -832. The German translation is in complete
accord with that given above, the sentence next to the last being rendered as
follows:
Und darum verordnen Wir, dass, wenn auch ein Sohn der Art die Rechte der
natuerlichen Verwandtschaft unverkuerzt behaelt, er doch, wenn der fremde
Adoptivvater testamentlos gestorben ist, auch zu dessen Beerbung, jedoch nur
zu dessen allein, das Recht eines Notherben erhalten soll, so dass er also nicht
auch die sonstigen agnatschen Rechte gegen die Familie des Adoptivvaters
erhaelt, noch diese gegen ihn in einige Gemeinschaft tritt, sondern er zu dieser
Familie wie ein Fremder dasteht.
' Italics are writers.
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matter of law remained a member of its old agnatic family, and the only
legal effect of such an adoption was that the child acquired a chance of
intestate succession to the person making the adoption."
These reforms instituted under Justinian had for their purpose the
giving of recognition to the natural tie of blood and the elimination of
the peculiar agnatic tie of the old Roman law and reflect changes in
the Roman social structure under the growing influence of Christian
teaching. These changes were wholly lost sight of in the discussion of
the Roman Law in a number of cases in this country." At least one
American court caught the distinction."
An argument is also met with at times to the effect that the provisions
found in the codes of modem civil law countries, such as France and
Germany, expressly excluding an adopted son from any right of in-
heritance from the adopters' relatives, changed the commonly accepted
rules of the Roman law in this respect. This is historically incorrect.
Those codes stated the law as it was and as it was understood to be.
The Roman law as accepted in Germany from about the year 1500
onward was the Roman law as codified by Justinian and modified by the
Medieval Italian Glossators and Commentators. While this law recog-
nized that adoption could have the full effect (plena) or a limited effect
(minus plena), depending on whether the adopter was a blood relative
or not, the only form in practical use was one modeled after adoptio
min-us plena.1 2 It was adoptio minus plena which was incorporated into
the Prussian Civil Code of 1794 and which later formed the basis of
the provisions of the German Civil Code of 19oo, §§ 1757-58-62-63.
The express language of § 1763 of the German Civil Code is as
follows:
"The effects of the adoption of a child do not extend to the relatives
of the adopter." (Translation by Loewy in The German Civil Code.)
Commenting on the Sources of this section, B. Mugdam, in his book,
Die Gesammten Materialien sum Buergerlichen Gesetzbuch, (transla-
tion, The Collected Sources of the German Civil Code), Berlin, 1899,
in Vol. 4, on page 519 says:
"Following the Roman and the general law, no relationship between
the adopted child and the relatives of the adopter is established by
Humphries v. Davis, ioo Ind. 274; 50 Am. Rep. 788.
Markover v. Kraus, 132 Ind. 294; 17 L.R.A. 8o6; 31 N.E., 1047.
Clark v. Clark, 76 N. H. 551; 85 Atd. 758.
"Woodward's Appeal, 81 Conn. 152; 7o Atl. 453, 457.
=Sohm's Institutes of Ronw= Law translated by Ledlie, pp. I51, 52; in
History of Germanic Private Law; Rudolph Huebner, in the Continental Legal
History Series, published by Little, Brown and Co., 1918, pp. 661, 662.
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means of adoptio minus plena and adoption by a woman. The contrary
provision of the Roman Law with respect to adrogation and adoptio
plena depends on the peculiar form of the Roman family. Whether
and to what extent in this connection the principles of adrogation and
adoptio plena are still applicable as a part of the general law is disputed.
In Wurttemburg, it is accepted that by adoption no relationship is
established between the adopted son and the relatives of the adopter.
This is also the viewpoint of the new laws (citations). The Prussian
Civil Code (I1, 2, § 71o) permits a family relationship to be established
between the adopted child and the relatives of the adopter by means of
a special family agreement. The first draft of the German Civil Code
(§1620, subs. 2) conforms with the modem law. An extension of the
relationship established by adoption to the relatives of the adopter would
go beyond the purpose of the Institutes, the necessities of the case and
the modem viewpoint. In opposition to the admission of such an ex-
tension by way of a family agreement, it may be stated that no necessity
exists in this direction as in the same situation in case of legitimation
by a declaration of legitimacy."
On page 529. in discussing the relationship between the adopted
child and his natural relatives, Mugdam points out:
"Concerning the Roman law, which pertains to adrogation and full
adoption, removal from the former agnatic relationship and loss of the
rights dependent upon that relationship can no longer be called in ques-
tion because the distinctions of agnatic relationship are foreign to the
modern viewpoint."
Von Holtzendorf, Encyclopaedic Der Rechtswissenschaft, (transla-
tion Encyclopedia of Law), Leipzig, 188o, says concerning adoption:
"The Roman principle is valid even today, although by the weakening
of paternal power and agnation, it has lost most of its importance. The
new legislation, especially the Saxon Civil Code and the Prussian Civil
Code, recognizes no difference between adrogation and adoption and
restricts the effect of adoption to adoptio minus 'plena so that the
adoptive father acquires neither management, life interest (usufruct)
nor rights of inheritance in the property of the adopted child, but the
adopted child only acquires rights to the property of the adoptive
parents and is not removed from his natural family."
In France, adoption does not appear to have been practiced before
the time of the Revolution, and consequently, the sections of the Roman
Law dealing with this subject were not accepted along with the rest of
the Justinian Code.
Brissaud, in the History of French Private Law, the Continental
Legal History series published by Little, Brown and Company, 1912,
says:
(§178, p. 218) "Having at an early period fallen into disuse, which
came about owing to the evolution of the family, adoption only appeared
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to our old jurisconsults as a Roman institution which had been rejected
by the customary law. It was not even in use in countries of written
law . . . .
(§79) "Under the Revolution, adoption entered into the law
without any necessity of its doing so, by being called up from classical
antiquity. The legislative assembly decreed that its committee on legis-
lation should include it in its general scheme of civil laws."
Concerning the preparation of the sections which finally appear in
the Code Napoleon, G. Baudry-Lancantinerie, Traitg de Droit Civil,
(translation, Treatise on the Civil Law), 1905, says:
(Vol. 4, P. 7) "After protracted debates the council ended by adopt-
ing the system which the code has sanctioned. It seems that the editors
of the code were inspired principally by the Prussian Code (prepared
in 1751, but not promulgated until 1794). Berlier, in the explanation
of its purposes, which he presented to the legislative body on the 21st
of the month, Ventose in the year XI (March 12, 1803), declared that
the authors of the provisions did not take into consideration the Roman
laws which could not be adapted to our customs but that they had
found the true point of departure in the Prussian Code."
With reference to the relationship established between the adopted
child and the relatives of the adopter, the code as finally enacted
provides:
(§350) "The adopted person does not acquire any right of in-
heritance in the property of the relatives of the adopter, but he has the
same rights as a legitimate child in the succession of the adopter, even
if other such children should be born to the adopter after the adoption."
While this section was under consideration by the Council of State,
M. Tronchet made the following pertinent remark which is quoted in
J. C. locr6's Esprit du Code Napoleon Tirg de la Discussion ou Con-
ference Historique, (translation, The Spirit of the Code Napoleon as
reflected in the discussion or historical conferences):
(p. 46o) "In the Council of State, one person observed, 'It is
impossible to admit that an individual by his own will may change the
order of succession of an entire family and give to all his relatives an
heir which the law has not designated. To modify the absurdity of
such a provision, one can conceive that the other relatives may be given
the option of exclusion or a reciprocity with regard to the rights of
inheritance. Vain precaution! Too often the collaterals either neglect
to exercise the option which the law gives them or surprised by death,
have no time to exercise it. On general principle, the effects of adoption
should not extend beyond the adopting father and the adopted child.'"
The whole subject of adoption as it appears in the Code Napoleon
is admirably discussed by Toullier in his Le Droit Civil Fran-ais,
(translation, The French Civil Law), 5th ed., Paris, 183o.
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He says:
(Vol. 2, pp. 254, 255, 256) "Adoption as it exists today has almost
nothing in common with the ancient adoption of the Romans except
the name. The basis upon which it rests, the characteristic effects,
the forms, all are different. Our legislators have even declared that
the adoption of the Romans cannot be adapted to our customs, and that
it should remain banished from our institutions.
"The principal and characteristic effect of adoption among the Romans
was to cause the adopted child to pass into the family of the adopting
person and to confer upon the latter all the rights of paternal power
over the person and over the property of the adopted child who, if he
was already the master of his own rights, sui juris, experienced in this
way a change in his status, capitis diminutio minima, or who, if he was
a son in a family, passed out of the power and the family of his natural
father to fall under the power and to enter into the family of his
adoptive father.
"On the contrary, according to the Civil Code, the adopted son remains
in his natural family; he preserves all his rights as a member of that
family (§348) ; he remains consequently under the control of his natural
father and mother without passing either under the power or into the
family of the adopting parent to whose relatives he is never able to
succeed.
"A complete change in the effects of adoption was brought about
under Justinian. This prince permitted these effects to continue only in
the case where the adopting parent was one of the ascendants of the
adopted child, for example, his maternal grandfather; in all other
cases Justinian desired that the adopted child should not pass either into
the family or under the power of the adoptive father, to whom only
he acquired the right to succeed on intestacy, without this right being
reciprocal. It is this adoption of Justinian that the doctors have called
imperfect.
"This imperfect adoption served as the prototype or model for the
adoption which was incorporated into the Prussian Code finally ac-
cepted in 1791, revised and promulgated in 1794, and it is upon that
adoption that our legislators have based a large part of the provisions
of the code. It is from that source that they have taken the idea of an
adoption which does not break the family ties between the adopted child
and his natural relatives, which does not cause the adopted child to
enter into the family of the adopting parent and which is only a
personal contract whose effects, confined to the parties alone, do not
extend to any other members of the family of the adoptive parent."
Provisions similar to those in the French and German Civil Codes
are found in most of the modern civil law countries. 13
'Swiss Civil Code of December IO, 1907, translated by Robert P. Schick;
Boston Book Co., Boston, U. S. A., 1915, Sec. 268; Civil Code of Spain,
with Philippine Notes, translated by F. C. Fischer, 1918; The Lawyers Co-op.
Publishing Co., New York, Art. 177.
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Thus we see that the Roman law in its final form, the form in which
it was handed down to modem Enrope, did not regard adoption as
forming the basis for inheritance or succession from the kindred of
the adoptive parent.
When we examine, from the historical and philosophical standpoint,
the change worked in the law under Justinian, we will find that it was
but one phase in the struggle toward the ultimate recognition of the call
of the blood as the correct principle governing intestate succession.
The old law, based upon agnatic relationship and patria potestas, was
entirely wiped out. In the one case where the adopted child was
already related to the adoptive parent, by ties of blood, for example,
where the adopting parent was his maternal grandfather, Justinian
permitted the old law to continue in effect. But even this was entirely
in accord with the principle of blood relationship, for the right of
succession was, as Justinian himself said, given by reason of blood
relationship rather than adoption.
The older Roman law, tied up as it was with the archaic conception of
the family, was entirely disregarded by the continental European
countries as being inapplicable to their social conditions, and the modern
codes of those countries merely re-enact those parts of the later Roman
law which had already been accepted as part of their general law.
